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AGENCY TO MAKE WARRANTIES
MERTON FERSON*
INTRODUCTION
What are warranties? How are they created? And, particularly,
what kind of authority or employment will enable one person to make a
warranty that will be binding on another person?
Let us first look at warranties- broadly and note their function. When
a sale is being made there is commonly a risk of some defect in the thing
sold. And in connection with other kinds of transactions there is frequently
a risk of loss that will occur if a certain fact exists or comes to pass. There
is, for example, a risk that the horse being sold js not sound; that the lot a
buyer looks at is not the lot described in his deed; or that the flour being sold
will not keep sweet on a contemplated sea voyage. The most common war-
ranties are in connection with sales. But warranties are frequently made in
connection with other kinds of legal transactions. A person taking out insur-
ance, for example, may warrant certain facts about the thing that is being
insured.' An agent is deemed to warrant his authority.2 A bailor may warrant
against defects in the thing bailed.3 A hotel company may warrant that the
room let for hire is free from vermin.4 And there may be a warranty that
food served for a price is fit to eat whether or not the serving is considered
to be a sale.5 The warranty, looked at broadly, is a device used as an adjunct
to sales and other transactions for allocating the risk that a certain fact
exists or will come to pass.
.Now let us look at warranties in their more technical aspects. The term
"warranty" has been used as though all warranties are of like character and
*Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles; Dean Emeritus, Uni-
versity of Cincinnati College of Law; Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University, 1948-51;
Author, THE RATIONAL BASIS OP CONTRACTS (1949), and numerous articles in the
Vanderbilt Law Review and other periodicals.
1. VANCE, INSURANCE 408 et seq. (3d ed., Anderson, 1951).
2. Collen v. Wright, 8 E. & B. 647, 120 Eng. Rep. 241 (Q.B. 1857).
3. Southern Iron & Equipment Co. v. Smith, 257 Mo. 226, 165 S.V. 804 (1914).
4. Silverman v. Imperial London Hotels, Ltd., 137 L.T. 57, 43 T.L.R. 260 (K.B.
1927). See the excellent Note, Should the Doctrine of Implied Warranties be Restricted
to Sales Transactions? 2 VAND. L. REv. 675 (1949).
5. Friend v. Childs Dining Hall Co., 231 Mass. 65, 120 N.E. 407 (1918).
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of like origin.6 This assumption may be justified so far as the character of
the warranty obligation is concerned. When such an obligation exists it
gives certain well defined remedies to the warrantee. But there are different
kinds of warranties when regard is had for their factual and theoretical bases.
The earliest warranties were deemed to be torts. "The law of war-
ranty is older by a century than special assumpsit."7 And yet warranties
have come to be regarded as contracts.8 Whence came the idea that all
warranties are contracts? Several things have contributed to build up the
idea. First, "... . the remedy for a breach of warranty was taken over into
the action of assumpsit, and it was thus established that it had a contract
character."'  Second, the damages for a breach of warranty are calculated
according to the formula that is used in cases of broken contract obligations.
That is to say, a warrantor, when sued for damages, is made to pay an amount
that will make the warrantee as well off as he would be if the facts had
turned out to be as they were warranted to be.'0 Third, warranties are
commonly given effect as defenses to actions that are brought on contracts.
"[T]he so-called warranty [in an insurance policy] is in fact a condition
qualifying the liability of the insurer."" And where there has been a breach
of warranty by the seller, the buyer of a chattel may have "recoupment in
diminution or extinction of the price."'1 2 Fourth, it often happens that one and
the same person makes the warranty and makes the sale or contract to which
it is appurtenant. For the various reasons that have been noted, "There is
no doubt that to-day the obligation of a warrantor is generally conceived of
as contractual."' 13
How are warranty obligations really created? That is our present in-
quiry, with special focus on agency to make warranties. A broad view of the
cases reveals that warranties differ in the ways they are created. Some are
contracts in the sense that the warrantors intended to bind themselves to
answer for the consequences if certain facts are, or come to be true. Others
are not contracts but are imposed, regardless of whether the warrantors in-
tended to bind themselves, merely because the warrantors made affirmations
of fact. And still others-also not contracts-are imposed for reasons of
6. "Further difficulties and anomalies are created by thinking in terms of names
rather than realities. If a given situation is presented in a particular form of action
or called by a particular name, it is apt to be regarded as governed by some analogy
to the principles applied to the situation originally dealt with in that form of action
and called by that name." Bohlen, Misrepresentation as Deceit, Negligence, or WVarranly,
42 HAtv. L. Ray. 733 (1929).
7. 1 Wn.uIsToN, SALES § 195 (Rev. ed. 1948).
8. Ibid.
9. PRossER, TORTS 705 (1941).
10. UNino m SALES AcT, § 69; 3 WILLISTON, SALES § 613 (Rev. ed. 1948).
11. 1 WILLISTON, SALEs § 181 (Rev. ed. 1948); Dayton v. Hooglund, 39 Ohio St. 671
(1884).
12. UNIom SALES AcT, § 69 (a).
13. 1 WLLsTON, SES § 197 (Rev. ed. 1948).
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policy, without either a promise or an affirmation on the part of the war-
rantors. The failure to note that some warranties are consensual and some
are not has produced confusion with regard to agency to make warranties.
The agency problem becomes simple when we note that some warranties
originate as contracts and that others are clapped onto the warrantors re-
gardless of their consent to be bound. An agent who presumes to make a
contract of warranty for his principal needs authority as he would to make
any other contract. He is attempting to bind his principal by doing a juristic
act.' 4 But when a representation is the basis of a warranty, "authority" on
the part of the person who speaks for another is an improper word and is
misleading. The one who makes the representation is a servant. He has done
a nonjuristic act: the only agency question involved is whether the servant
was acting within the scope of his employment. The agency question is the
same as it would be if the representation had constituted fraud, estoppel or
negligence.
Let us consider seriatim (1) agency to make warranties that derive from
contractual promises, (2) warranties that derive from affirmations and (3)
warranties that are imposed for reasons of policy without either a promise or
affirmation having been made on behalf of the warrantors.
WARRANTIES THAT ARE CONTRACTS
A warranty can be a contractual promise even though it sounds like a
statement of fact. "Words which in terms promise the happening or failure
to happen of something not within human control, or the existence or non-
existence of a present or past state of facts, are to be interpreted as a promise
or undertaking to be answerable for such proximate damage as may be caused
by the failure to happen or the -happening of the specified event, or by the
existence or non-existence of the asserted state of facts."' 5 "Even where the
undertaking relates to an existing or past fact, as in case of a warranty that
a horse is sound, or that a ship arrived in a foreign port some days previously,
the existence and validity of the undertaking is dealt with in the same way
as if the warrantor could cause the fact to be as he asserted. .. ,us "There
can be no doubt now, of course," says Professor Williston, "that a seller may
promise, in consideration of the purchase of goods from him, that he will be
answerable for their present, or, indeed, for their future condition. Nor is it
open to doubt that a seller who in terms warrants the goods which he sells,
14. The term, juristic act, is here used to mean an act of consenting to be bound
in a legal transaction, such as a grant or contract. An extended discussion of the
difference between juristic acts and nonjuristic acts appears in FEmsoN, THE'RTxrOFAX
BASIS OF CoNmAcrs 60-83 (1949) ; and Ferson, Bases for Master's Liability and for
Principal's Liability to Third Persons, 4 VAND. L. Rev. 260, 270-72 (1950).
'15. RESTATEmENT, CONMAcTs § 2 (2) (1932).
16. Id. § 2, comment a (1932).
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thereby enters into such a contract."'1 7 Such a warranty may be consented to
as an integral part of a "dickered" bargain,' 8 or it may be consented to as a
collateral obligation. The extent of the warranty may be indicated by samples,
specifications or blue prints. Past deliveries-like samples-may indicate
what a seller warrants with regard to the goods he now sells or contracts to
sell.' 9 The basic fact common to this group of warranties is the warrantors'
consent to assume the warranty obligations.
A warranty with regard to a fact that may come to pass in the future is
naturally promissory and contractual. 20 We shall under the next subhead
consider warranties that spring from affirmations of fact. But the affirmation
of a future fact would be an anachronism. While a promissory warranty
could be imposed without the warrantors' consent, illustrations are far to seek
of promissory warranties that are not contracts.
Now comes the question of agency to make a warranty that depends on
the warrantors' consent. The compendious answer to the question is this:
Such a warranty being contractual, the power of an agent to make it is created
like the power of an agent to make any other contract. It calls for real or
apparent authorization by the principal. "[T] he better view is that evidence
is necessary either of actual authority or that the practice of giving a warranty
in a sale of the sort in question was so usual that a reasonable man would
have understood that the power was granted."'21
In many borderline cases a principal has authorized an agent to make a
conveyance or contract, and the problem is whether the authorization includes
power to make the warranty in question. In Upton v. Suffolk County Mills,22
for instance, an agent who had been authorized to sell-in the sense of
transfer-flour for his principal, presumed to warrant that the flour he sold
would keep sweet on a sea voyage from Boston to California. The court
held that the agent's power to sell did not include the power to make this
hazardous warranty. Numerous cases indicate that the power to sell does not
necessarily include the power to make a contractual warranty with regard to
the thing being sold.2 3 Professor Williston emphasizes that the question of
17. Willigton, Liability for Honest Misrepresentation, 24 HARV. L. REV. 415, 470
(1911).
18. UNIFORMA COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-313, comment U 1 (Proposed Final Draft, Text
and Comments ed. 1950).
19. Id. § 2-313, comment .1 7.
20. "In Upton v. Suffolk County Mills, 11 Cush. 586 [Mass. 1853], the warranty
was that the flour should keep sweet during a sea-voyage, not that the flour was sweet
at the time of sale. A warranty that an article when sold is sound, is materially different
from a warranty that an article shall continue to remain sound for an indefinite period
of time." Randall v. Kehlor, 60 Me. 37, 47 (1872).
21. 2 WILLISTON, SALES § 445b (Rev. ed. 1948).
22. 11 Cush. 586 (Mass. 1853).
23. Herring, Farrell & Sherman v. Skaggs, 62 Ala. 180 (1878) (power of an agent
to sell safes held not to include power to warrant that safes were burglar proof; Moore
v. Switzer, 78 Colo. 63, 239 Pac. 874 (1925) (agent's power to sell secondhand automobile
[ Vol,. 5
ACENCY TO MAKE WARRANTIES
an agent's power to make a contractual warranty is one of fact.24 The agent
has this power only if there is sufficient evidence of his real or apparent
authorization. And it would seem that a principal should be able to limit the
power of his selling agent with respect to the making of warranties in the
same way that he can limit the power of his agent in other respects. The
general rule is that a principal can impose any limitation he may desire.23
This is so, however difficult it may be for the third person to ascertain the
facts on which the agent's authority depends.
26
AFFIRMATION WARRANTIES
We now turn from warranties that originate as contracts to warranties
that derive from affirmations of fact and are imposed regardless of the war-
rantors' consent to be bound in warranty obligations. An affirmation, like
a promise, may be express or implied. And, also like a promise, it can be
the basis for a warranty. 27 Professor Williston, having discussed warranties
that are created by promises, goes on by saying:
"This, however, does not either upon authority or reason exhaust the possibilities
of express warranties. It should not be the law, and by the weight of modern authority,
it is not the law that a seller who by positive affirmation induces a buyer to enter
into a bargain can escape from liability by convincing the court that his affirmation
was not an offer to contract. A positive representation of fact is enough to render
him liable. . . .The representation of fact which induces a bargain is a warranty."'
held not to include power to promise vendee that he could return the car and get his
money back if he found the cylinders were scored) ; Braun v. S. F. Hess & Co., 187
Ill. 283, 58 N.E. 371 (1900) (general agent to sell cigarettes held not to have authority
to warrant that a vendee would not lose rebates he had been receiving from another
company if the vendee bought from the principal of this agent) ; Palmer v. Hatch, 46 Mo.
585 (1870) (power of agent to sell whiskey held not to include power to warrant that
the whiskey will not be seized by the government) ; N. Friedman & Sons v. Kelly, 126
Mo. App. 279, 102 S.W. 1066 (travelling salesman's power to sell held not to include
power to contract that the buyer might return for credit the goods he could not sell) ;
Reid v. Alaska Packing Co., 47 Ore. 215, 83 Pac. 139 (1905) (agent to sell Alaska
salmon held not to have authority to warrant that the salmon he contracted to sell
was "equal to the best Puget Sound Fancy Sockeye"); Nixon Mining Drill Co. v.
Burk, 132 Tenn. 481, 178 S.W. 1116 (1915) (agent to sell motor truck held not to
have authority to warrant that the tires would last a given length of time) ; Johns v.
Jaycox, 67 Wash. 403, 121 Pac. 854 (1912) (agent selling talking machines to be
given away by the purchaser to his customers as an advertisement, held not to have
authority to guarantee that the purchaser would sell 25 records for every machine he
gave away) ; Pickert v. Marston, 68 Wis. 465, 32 N.W. 550 (1887) (agent to sell fish
held to have no authority to warrant that the fish would not spoil during shipment,
in the absence of custom, but proof of a custom to warrant held competent).
24. 2WILLISTON, SALES § 445a (Rev. ed. 1948).
25. Ferson, Bases for Master's Liability and for Principars Liability to Third
Persons, 4 VAND. L. REv. 260, 267 n.26 (1951).
26. Mussey v. Beecher, 3 Cush. 511 (Mass. 1849).
27. "Definlition of express warrant.-Any affirmation of fact or any promise by
the seller relating to the good is an express warranty if the natural tendency of such
affirmation or promise is to induce the buyer to purchase the goods, and if the buyer
purchases the goods relying thereon." UNIFORM SALES AcT § 12. The Act is adopted
in 37 jurisdictions.
28. 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 197 (Rev. ed. 1948).
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The same author, in another connection has this to say:
"[W]hen a seller is held liable on a warranty for making an affirmation of fact
in regard to goods in order to induce their purchase, to hold such an affirmation is
a contract is to speak the language of pure fiction. In truth, the obligation imposed
on the seller in such a case is imposed upon him not by virtue of his agreement to
assume it, but because of a rule of law applied irrespective of agreement. The obliga-
tion is quasi-contractual, inasmuch as the remedy of assumpsit is allowed for its
enforcement. The confusion of a thought, as to the nature of the obligation seems to
be in great measure due to the allowance in modern times of this remedy for breach
of any warranty, whether in reality constituting a contract or only a representation.""
In order to show the kinship between affirmation-warranties and other
forms of liability that are created by representations, let us take a hypothet-
ical negotiation and sale. Cornwall, a farmer, had horses for sale. Thompson
was a prospective buyer. Cornwall said to Sambo, his hired man, in the
presence of Thompson, "Show Mr. Thompson those two young horses, Pom-
pey and Darby. Tell him about them and be sure not to make any false
statement. If Mr. Thompson decides to buy one of the horses, bring him
back to the house and I shall close the deal with him." Sambo and Mr.
Thompson proceeded to the barn. Sambo led out Pompey for inspection. Mr.
Thompson said, "Is this horse broken to ride ?" Sambo said, "Yes, he is well
broken to ride." Mr. Thompson, thus assured, mounted Pompey. In fact,
the horse had never been ridden before; he pitched violently and threw Mr.
Thompson against a fence, breaking his arm, as X-ray pictures later showed.
Sambo then led out Darby and Mr. Thompson turned his attention to
Darby. Sambo told Mr. Thompson that Darby was sired by Man-O-War,
knowing full well that the statement was false and intending to deceive Mr.
Thompson. Sambo also told Mr. Thompson that Darby was sound. Sambo
believed that this latter statement was true; but, in fact, Darby had the heaves
and a stringhalt.
Mr. Thompson was pleased with Darby and returned to the house.
Cornwall gave Mr. Thompson a bill of sale for the horse and collected the
purchase price. Mr. Thompson took Darby away with him. Do the incidents
of this negotiation, and the sale that resulted, put Cornwall under any
liability to Thompson? Sambo has made a series of statements. Each one
takes its color and legal significance from the circumstance.
First, Sambo said that Pompey had been broken to ride. The statement
was carelessly made and was false; and it misled Thompson to his injury.
This was negligent conduct on the part of Sambo. "In a relatively large
number of negligence cases," says Dean Prosser, "liability has been rested
upon some lorm of misrepresentation on the part of the defendant.... Even
29. Williston, Liability for Honest Misrepresentation, 24 HARV. L. REV. 415, 420
(1911).
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where the defendant is not consciously misstating the facts, he may still be
liable for negligence in speaking where he has not exercised proper care to
ascertain the truth."30 Was Cornwall liable for this negligent misrepresenta-
tion made by Sambo? Sambo was not authorized to make the statement. But
any question about the authority of Sambo is beside the point. He was em-
ployed as a servant to tell Thompson about the horses. His representation that
Pompey was broken to ride made it appear that there would be no danger
in getting onto the horse's back. That negligent statement, like any other
negligent act in the scope of Sambo's employment would make Cornwall liable
for the consequences. 31
Second, Sambo told Mr. Thompson that Darby was sired by Man-O-
War. This statement was, by our assumption, known to be false and was made
with an intention to deceive Thompson. When acted on, it made out a clear
case of deceit. This statement also was not authorized but was within the
scope of Sambo's employment and Cornwall should be held liable.
3 2
Third, Sambo said that Darby was sound. This affirmation was different
from Sambo's affirmation that Pompey had been broken to ride in that it did
not constitute negligence. It was different from Sambo's statement that
Darby had been sired by Man-O-War in that it did not constitute deceit.'
Sambo believed that Darby was sound and did not mean to deceive. The
representation that "Darby is sound" would, however, be a sufficient basis
for a warranty if it were made by Cornwall. And since it was clearly within
30. PROSSER, TORTS 252-53 (1941). See also id. at 701-02. "There is nothing
novel in recognizing negligent misstatements as a basis of tort liability .... [T] here
are innumerable cases in which merely negligent misrepresentations of the conditions
of buildings or of chattels have been held to create liability towards those, who in
reliance upon them, have entered the buildings or used the chattels to their bodily
injury." Bohlen, Should Negligent Misrepresentations Be Treated as Negligence or
Fraud? 18 VA. L. REV. 703, 705 (1932). See also Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168
Wash. 456, 12 P. 2d 409 (1932) (plaintiff injured by flying glass from a windshield
that had been represented by the manufacturer to be nonshatterable) ; Cameron v.
Mount, 86 Wis. 477, 56 N.W. 1094 (1893) (plaintiff induced to drive defendant's
horse by defendant's representation that the horse was gentle and free from tricks);
Bohlen, Misrepresentation as Deceit, Negligence or Warranty, 42 HARv. L. REv. 733
(1929).
31. Gleason v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 278 U.S. 349, 49 Sup. Ct. 161, 73 L. Ed.
415 (1929); Woodburn v. Standard Forgings Corp., 112 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1940);
Chicago & A. Ry. v. Cox, 145 Fed. 157, 160 (8th Cir. 1906); Seaboard Air Line Ry.
v. Ebert, 102 Fla. 641, 138 So. 4 (1931); Buchanan v. Chicago M. & St. P. R. R.,
75 Iowa 393, 39 N.W. 663 (1888); Stevens v. Boston & Maine R.R., 1 Gray 277
(Mass. 1854) ; Peck v. Michigan Cent. R.R., 57 Mich. 3, 23 N.W. 466 (1885) ; Williams
v. Goldberg, 58 Misc. 210, 109 N. Y. Supp. 15 (Sup. Ct. 1908).
32. "[N] o sensible distinction can be drawn between the case of fraud and the
case of any other wrong. The general rule is that the master is answerable for every
such wrong of the servant or agent as is committeed in the course of the service and for
the master's benefit, though no express command or privity of the master be proved,"
Willis, J., in Barwick v. English Joint Stock Bank, L.R. 2 Ex. 259, 265 (1867). "This
case," says Professor Philip Mechem, ". . . represents the settled law of England and
that of the very great majority of American States." MECHEM, CASES ON AGENCY
230 (3d ed. 1942). See also FEasoN, THE RATIONAL BAsIs oF CoNTRAcTs 252 et seq.
(1949).
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the scope of Sambo's employment to make such a representation it should
be charged to Cornwall.
The three representations that Sambo made have been considered in
juxtaposition in order to show the kinship that exists between affirmation-
warranties and other representations.m The representations Sambo made
differ one from another in their legal effect. But as acts they are alike and
the question of Sambo's agency to make any one of the representations is the
same whether the representation, when made, constituted negligence, fraud
or warranty. Sambo was not authorized to make any of these representations
in the sense that Cornwall consented to be charged with them. Cornwall did
not even apparently consent to be bound by or charged with false representa-
tions that Sambo might make. But the point is that agency (in the broad
sense) to make this kind of a warranty is not a question of authority to make
a contract; it is rather a question of employment to make a statement. Sambo
was within his real and apparent employment when he made the statementsa
4
They should be charged to Cornwall.
It must be admitted that judges and other writers commonly use the term
"authority" to describe the ability of one person to make another person liable
on a warranty. In many cases, however, an employer is charged as a war-
rantor when he has given his employee neither real nor apparent authority
to make the warranty. The factual requirement is not authorization but is
that the employee shall have made the affirmation within the scope of his
employment. In Boehm v. Friedman,;5 the servant-agent bad induced the
plaintiff to buy a mule by representing that it was a "good working mule."
In truth the mule "could not be coerced to work under any circumstances."
The representation was deemed to create a warranty. Said McGehee, J.,
"Representations which are usually incident to such a transaction are held to
have been made with authority by an agent entrusted with the sale of an
animal, although wuithout authority or apparent authority to give a warranty
in regard thereto."3 6 In Sharlette v. Lake Placid Co.,3
7 a servant-agent had
induced the plaintiff to buy pigs by representing that the pigs "were alright
33. A positive declaration of quality, possessing all the other requisites of a war-
ranty, does not cease to be a warranty because known to be false, and, therefore a
fraud. "[A]ny distinct assertion or affirmation of quality made by the owner [or
servant to make such affirmations] during a negotiation for the sale of a chattel, which
it may be supposed was intended to cause the sale, and was operative in causing it,
will be regarded either as implying or as constituting a warranty. If such affirmation
were made in good faith, it is still a warranty; and if made with knowledge of its
falsity, it is a warranty, and it is also a fraud." 1 PARsoN s, CoNTaAcrs 579-80 (5th
ed. 1866) ; First Acceptance Corp. v. Kennedy, 95 F. Supp. 861 (N.D. Iowa 1951).
34. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Steckel, 216 Iowa 1189, 250 N.W. 476 (1933)
(later overruled on another point).
35. 190 Miss. 664, 1 So.2d 508 (1941).
36. 1 So.2d at 509 (italics added).
37. 194 App. Div. 844, 185 N.Y. Supp. 543 (3d Dep't 1921).
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and free from cholera." The master-principal was charged with a warrantv.
Said Kellogg, P. J., "An agent of the seller owes the duty to his principal
truly to state the qualities of the things to be sold and present them in
as attractive a way as the circumstances permit. . . . If Bellmere [the
servant-agent] believed the pigs were well, he would not have faithfully rep-
resented his master when asked about hog cholera, if he had refused to speak."
And, it may be added, a representation is still as representation whether it
is true or false. In Nelson v. Cowing and Seymour,3s it appeared that David
Cowing had sold pumps for his principal-master and there was evidence that
he warranted the pump sold to the defendant. Said Bronson, J., "True, there
is no direct proof that David had authority to warrant the pumps, or make
any representation concerning their quality or condition. But a warranty-
and so of a representation-is one of the usual means for effecting the sale
of a chattel."
39
The job to be done by an employee, in such cases as the ones just cited,
is to work on a third person and persuade him to enter a bargain. That job
is commonly done by making representations-a kind of nonjuristic act. On
general principles, therefore, the employer should be charged with representa-
tions made by his servant whether the particular representation makes out
negligence, fraud or affirmation-warranty. By a large majority of the decisions
the master is so held.
40
What is the difference between "authorizing" and "employing"? It will
bear repeating that authorizing an agent is like the making of an offer to
enter a legal transaction. An offer is a consenting to be bound if the offeree
shall render the specified acceptance. 4 ' An authorization is a consenting to
be bound if the agent and a third person shall agree to such and such a
38. 6 Hill 336 (N.Y. 1941).
39. Id. at 338 (italics added).
40. Miller v. Economy Hog & Cattle Powder Co., 228 Iowa 626, 293 N.W. 4 (1940);
Sokoloski v. Splann, 311 Mass. 203, 40 N.E.2d 874 (1942); Weiner v. D.A. Schulte,
Inc., 275 Mass. 379, 176 N.E. 114 (1931); Bagnall v. Frank Fehr Brewing Co., 203
Mo. App. 635, 221 S.V. 793 (1920) ; Darks v. Scudders-Gale Grocer Co., 146 Mo. App.
246, 130 S.W. 430 (1910); Laumeier v. Dolph, 145 Mo. App. 78, 130 S.W. 360 (1910);
Haynor Mfg. Co. v. Davis, 147 N. C. 267, 61 S.E. 54 (1908).
"Even though the agent may not be deemed to be authorised to make represen-
tations, but he nevertheless does so as part of the sale, the principal may be affected
by them." MECHEzi, AGENCY § 890 (2d ed. 1914). One who employs an interpreter
is charged with the interpreter's rendition. Miller v. Lathrop, 50 Minn. 91, 52 N.W.
274 (1892) ; Bonelli v. Burton, 61 Ore. 429, 123 Pac. 37 (1912).
On the assumption that "authority" is necessary in order that an agent can make
a warranty, courts have sought to find authority as an included power in the power to
sell. Following this line of thought the test has often been said to be this: Is it usual
in the sale of such goods as are being sold to give the warranty in question? TIFFANY,
AGENCY 72 (2d ed. 1924); Nelson v. Cowing & Seymour, 6 Hill 336 (N.Y. 1844);
Westurn v. Page, 94 Wis. 251, 68 N.W. 1003 (1896). Such a test is ambiguous because
the word "sell" has two meanings. Sometimes it means to work on a prospective buyer
and persuade him to part with his money; and, sometimes it means to consent that a
title shall pass in exchange for a price.
41. For more detailed discussion see FERSON, supra note 25, at 266.
1951 ]
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transaction. Employment is something else. It consists in procuring, or
merely accepting, the service of another in the doing of nonjuristic acts. The
liability of the master is thrust upon him regardless of his consent. Such is
the doctrine of respondeat superior.
Readers of Mark Twain's stories will recall this episode. Tom Sawyer
and Huckleberry Finn had on hand the business of rescuing a colored prisoner
from a hut that had no floor. Tom, a great stickler for principle, had a
notion that the only heroic way to rescue their man was to dig an opening
under the hut with a case knife. The job had been done in that manner in
stories Tom had read. A pick ax was at hand but Tom spurned the use of
such an instrument until his companion, Huck, had the gumption to hand Tom
a pick ax, calling it a "case knife." That made the tool quite satisfactory
and usable. So it is with agency to make affirmation-warranties and other
representations. Factual employment is sufficient to create such agency"but
warranties are thought of as contracts and so the ability of one person to
make another person liable on a warranty must be called "authority."
The point has been made that one who claims to have a warranty by
virtue of a contract made by an agent of the warrantor must show that the
agent had authority to make it, while one who claims a warranty by virtue of
a statement made by a servant of the warrantor needs only to show that the
statement fell within the scope of the servant's employment. What if the
servant-agent attempts both to state that a fact is so, and to contract that
his principal will indemnify if the fact is not so? The servant-agent might,
for instance, say that the horse he is boosting for sale is sound and also
presume to contract that his principal will indemnify the buyer if the horse
is not sound.42 There is thus an overlap of the two kinds of warranties. It
would seem that the warrantee should have the advantage of whichever kind
of warranty he can establish. And so where the servant-agent has made a
statement that is sufficient basis for a warranty, the warrantee should not
be put to the burden of showing that the speaker had authority. It is at
this point that most of the confusion about agency to make warranties has
come. The case of Elhuer v. Priestley43 will serve to illustrate. In that case
a salesman had said of the goods he was boosting for sale that they were "all
wool." But the court did not charge the employer with a warranty. The
judge said that, in the absence of authority, an agent cannot warrant. The
42. It would seem that in most instances where a servant agent presumes expressly
to make a contractual warranty his words would include a statement of fact as well as
a promise. Such a statement of fact could reasonably be implied in most express war-
ranties except promissory warranties-i.e., warranties with regard to what will be a
fact in the future.
43. 39 Misc. 535, 80 N.Y. Supp. 371 (N.Y. City Ct. 1902); and see Art Metal
Works, Inc. v. Abraham & Straus, Inc., 4 F. Supp. 303 (E.D.N.Y. 1933).
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decision does not seem to recognize the possibility of an affirmation-warranty
being made by a servant speaking within the scope of his employment.
WARRANTIES IMPOSED WITHOUT PROMISES OR AFFIRMATIONS
Warranties have been deemed to exist in a good many instances where
the warrantor had not made any promise or affirmation, and no one had
made any promise or affirmation for them.44 The basis of such warranties
is like the basis of other quasi-contracts; they are imposed by courts for the
sake of justice and expediency. A Texas case will serve to illustrate "an
implied warranty imposed by operation of law." In Jacob E. Decker & Sons,
Inc. v. Capps45 it appeared that the defendant had manufactured sausage. It
was packed in cellophane wrappers and sold under the trade name "Cervalet"
to a retailer. The plaintiff bought a package of this sausage soon after it came
to the retailer and it was served to the plaintiff's family. The sausage proved
to be poisonous and members of the plaintiff's family, after eating the sausage,
became ill. One child died. Suit having been brought against the defendant,
the jury found that the sausage, at the time of its manufacture, was con-
taminated and poisonous but that the defendant was not negligent and "did
not fail to properly inspect the sausage" and that "the illness suffered by
Capps' family from eating the sausage was the result of an unavoidable
accident." On these facts should the defendant be held liable? Tie" court,
after noting that there is some difference of authority, aligned itself with the
side holding the defendant, and frankly gave its reasons for so holding as
follows:
44. Of a number of cases allowing recovery on implied Warranties in recent years,
see: Smith v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 170 F.2d 474 (8th Cir. 1948) (plaintiff
purchased unwholesome spinach at a grocery), 4 Aim. L. REV. 98 (1949) ; Amdal v. F. W.
Woolworth Co., 84 F. Supp. 657 (N.D. Iowa 1949) (restaurateur served plaintiff with
ice cream containing glass), 35 IowA L. REv. 724 (1950), 34 MiNN. L. REv. 156 (1950),
23 So. CAL. L. Rnv. 289 (1950) ; Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., Ltd., 14 Cal.2d 272
93 P.2d 799 (1939) (plaintiff became ill after eating a maggoty cheese sandwich pre-
pared in sealed package by defendant), 15 IND. L.J. 242 (1940), 25 WAsH. U.L.Q. 293
(1940) ; Cliett v. Lauderdale Biltmore Corp., 39 So.2d 476 (Fla. 1949) (plaintiff served
unwholesome food in hotel dining room), 3 MiAmi L.Q. 638; Swengle v. F. & E. Whole-
sale Grocery Co., 145 Kan. 555, 77 P.2d 930 (1938) (wholesaler liable to consumer of
poisonous sauerkraut juice), 52 HARv. L. REv. 328 (1938) ; Delta Nehi Bottling Co. v.
Lucas, 184 Miss. 693, 185 So. 561 (1939) (plaintiff became ill after finding paper clip
in soft drink bottle), 24 IowA L. Rgv. 790; Yochem v. Gloria, Inc., 134 Ohio St. 427,
17 N.E.2d 731 (1938) (defendant restaurateur served plaintiff contaminated drinking
water with meal), 38 MIcH. L. Rxv. 269 (1939) ; Bonenberger v. Pittsburg Mercantile
Co., 345 Pa. 559, 28 A.2d 913 (1942) (plaintiff recovered from retailer for injury caused
by shell in can of oysters), 47 DIcK. L. REv. 124 (1943), 17 Tn'P. U.L.Q. 203 (1943) ;
Ford v. Waldorf System, Inc., 57 R.I. 131, 188 Ati. 633 (1936) (restaurant keeper liable
for serving food unfit for human consumption to plaintiff), 15 CrI-KENT RaV. 253
(1937). For recent law review materials, see Notes, 9 MoNT. L. Rv. 101 (1948), 14
N,Y.U.L.Q. REv. 519 (1937), 23 TuLANE L. REV. 96 (1948).
45. 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W2d 828 (1942), 28 WASH. U.L.Q. 287 (1943). See also
Sencer v. Carl's Market's, Inc., 45 So.2d 671 (Fla. 1950), 3 ALA. L. REv. 251, 3 U. oF
FLA. L. REv. 380, 99 U. or PA. L. REv. 111. -.:
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"A majority of the American courts that have followed this holding have not
based such warranty upon an implied term in the contract between buyer and seller,
nor upon any reliance by the buyer on the representation of the seller, but have imposed
it as a matter of public policy in order to discourage the sale of unwholesome food....
While a right of action in such a case is said to spring from a 'warranty', it should
be noted that the warranty here referred to is not the more modern contractual
warranty, but is an obligation imposed by law to protect public health."'"
In another Texas case,47 the facts were similar to the facts in the Capps
case except that suit was brought against the retailer. The plaintiff was
allowed to recover and again the court was explicit in stating the grounds
for its decision. It said:
"[W]e held [in the Capps case] that a non-negligent manufacturer who processed
and sold contaminated food to a retailer for resale for human consumption was liable
to the consumer thereof for the injuries sustained by him as a result of eating of
such food. That holding was not based upon any supposed negligence of the manu-
facturer, nor upon the breach of any warranty implied in fact from the supposed
terms of the contract, but was based upon the broad principle of an implied warranty
imposed by law as a matter of public policy for the protection of human health and
life.""
The illustrations that have been given of warranties imposed by law
were cases where impure food had been sold; and there was some emphasis,
in those cases, on the "public policy" involved in food sales. But warranties
are sometimes imposed by law in other kinds of transactions. Judge Learned
Hand, in dealing with an implied warranty that a ship was seaworthy, gave
the frank and realistic explanation that implied warranties are "obligations
imposed 'in invitum,"" and says further, "it is only by a fiction that we call
them promises at all in the sense that express warranties are promises.1
49
Judge Lehman, in dealing with the implied warranty by an agent that he has
authority, says, "The doctrine of an implied warranty is based upon a fic-
tion." 50 And it has even been suggested that an insurance company should
be held to warrant that a policy it puts out is fit "to cover the risk for which
it was secured." 5'
46. 164 S.W.2d at 829, 831 (1942).
47. Griggs Canning Co. v. Josey, 139 Tex. 623, 164 S.W.2d 835 (1942).
48. Ibid.
49. Strika v. Netherlands Ministry of Traffic, 185 F.2d 555, 558 (2d Cir. 1950), 4
VAND. L. REv. 921 (1951).
50. Moore v. Maddock, 251 N.Y. 420, 167 N.E. 572, 574 (1929). Professor Jeremiah
Smith under the subhead, "As to Fiction Contracts," says: "Under this head must be
classed a very large number of cases which, under the old forms of action, were enforced
in an action of contract, but in which there was no contract whatever, the promise alleged
in the declaration being an absolute fiction. . . . 'The term "contract implied in law"
is used, however, to denote, not the nature of the evidence by which the claim of the
plaintiff is to be established, but the source of the obligation itself. It is a term used to
cover a class of obligations where the law, though the defendant did not intend to assume
an obligation, imposes an obligation upon him, notwithstanding the absence of intention
on his part, and in many cases in spite of his actual dissent.'" Smith, Surviving Fictions,
27 YALE L.J. 317, 324 (1918).
51. Note, 35 YALE L.J. 203, 208 (1926).
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These warranties that are imposed by law pose no question of authority
to make 'a promise, or employment to make an affirmation. They are, as
Judges Hand ind Lehman have said, "fictions." When a sale, or other trans-
action to which implied-in-law warranties attach, has been made, the ap-
propriate warranty is imposed as an inevitable incident and without any
regard for what the agent promised or affirmed. The fact that the sale was
made through an agent rather than directly by the principal does not affect
the warranty in any way.
But there is one warranty which is imposed as a matter of law in which
the agency relationship may possibly affect the seller's liability. This is the
warranty that the article being sold is fit for the buyer's use. It is a factor
in creating this warranty that the seller must know the intended use of the
article. Is it sufficient if his servant knows about the intended use of the
article? On both principle and authority, the seller is charged with the
notice.5 2 Assuming that it is within the scope of the servant's employment
to communicate the notice, the master has the information or else the servant
has been remiss. The master is chargeable in either event.
5 3
SUMMARY
Some warranties originate as contracts--i.e., they spring from the consent
of the warrantors to be bound. To make such a warranty binding on his
principal, an agent must have authority, as he must to bind his principal in
any other contract. The usual rules with regard to authorization apply.
Some warranties are imposed without regard to the warrantors' consent,
by reason of affirmations of fact that have been made by, or on behalf of, the
warrantors. The representation is a nonjuristic act: A servant who makes
it does not have to be authorized in order to charge the master. The rule of
respondeat superior applies.
Still other warranties are imposed by law for reasons of justice and
expediency. They are a kind of quasi-contract and are not dependent on
promises or affirmations. Assuming a sale or other transaction to have been
made by a principal, or by an agent who was authorized to make it, there
is no separate question about agency to make this kind of a warranty. It
is implied-in-law.
52. Graham v. Jordan Marsh Co., 319 Mass. 690, 67 N.E.2d 404 (1946); Weiner
v. D. A. Schulte, Inc., 275 Mass. 379, 176 N.E. 114 (1931) ; Lentz v. Omar Baking Co.,
125 Neb. 861, 252 N.W. 410 (1934); Fulwiler v. Lawrence, 7 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1928).
53. See Ferson, Agency to Make Representations, 2 VAND. L. REV. 1, 22 (1948).
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